Andromeda

The choice could hardly be clearer. One guy wants to press you down, or push you back. He will chop you, jab you, and punch you in the ear.

The other choice welcomes, welcomes you, really welcomes you, and is glad you're here. Hooray! Hooray! Uh, now, she's stuck like that. Yep, they won't come down. Oh, they're they go.

Andromeda Blog is aware the ISS and STS-121 crews have insisted that Andromeda Blog be piped up to them three times a day. With that in mind, it is with some trepidation that we announce a major flaw in the manned space program. A MAJOR FLAW! Which we announce with some trepidation.

The major flaw with the manned space program being that it is manned. The second major flaw being that it is a human "program." No offense to any humans who may be reading this. (No, we're not kidding ourselves. Why do you ask? We have non-robot readers. 00100101010101001010?) Throwing humans into space costs a fortune. Yet you puny HEW-MAWNS are hardly capable of collecting, storing, and transmitting the data we could put on a 1-ounce microchip, which hardly eats anything, and whose digestive wastes are less than an ant's. Compared to a human crew, which produces total waste per day of over 150,000 pounds per person according to our rough estimates. And who really should be regarded as an opportunistic infection of our space craft.

Andromeda Blog wholeheartedly endorses NASA Administrator Mike Griffin's feelings regarding feelings, so we cannot help expressing our outrage at the joy expressed by Expedition 13 team members Pavel Vinogradov and Jeff Williams when, by some miracle, Shuttle Commander Steve Lindsey managed to dock the shuttle. Apparently intent on "showing" Andromeda Blog, Commander Lindsey was constantly revving the shuttle's engines during the RPM, as though wasting propellant was his "F"-you answer to Eileen Collins minimum-propellant rendezvous pitch manuever and docking. NASA Administrator Griffin would consider such an emotional display "illogical," but there was Lindsey, doing donuts round and round the ISS, until he finally came screeching up to docking with the station.

Pavel and Jeff were obviously very happy after the docking, as the NASA video showed, but Andromeda Blog's special team of lip readers can now divulge that what Vinogradov and Williams were saying during the ISS post-docking congratulatory high-fives was, "Good God, is ANY of the vodka going to arrive intact?!"

Andromeda Blog hereby declares itself satisfied that the risks associated with this launch are understood. Andromeda Blog (with its over-sized ones) is willing to take the risk, in the sense of letting seven of humanity's best take the risk, of this launch. Although Andromeda Blog continues to be annoyed that NASA Administrator Mike Griffin continues to understate the crew risk, we are confident the crew does actually understand the true risk, and that the launch is not taking place on the basis of such statements. Andromeda Blog does not back off ONE INCH from its previous statements that Mike Griffin is goofy-looking, but it now supports the "GO" decision. That is all.

NASA has refused to produce Flight Readiness Review documents in response to Florida Today's FOIA request. For the last launch, they produced them. For this launch, they said, "Mind your own bees wax!"

For good reason, too. Last time Florida Today got ahold of such documents, they raised such a hue and cry that STS-114 never left the pad, the shuttle program shut down and everyone who worked on the program was embarrassed and unemployed. No, wait, that's not right. They got the documents, the shuttle took off, the foam problem that was supposedly solved proved to be ongoing and NASA was embarrassed and one mistake closer to complete shutdown of the whole program.

Hmm. So maybe the reason is NASA wants to protect the open-ness of their internal deliberations. After all, certainly the chief engineer and the Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance would never give honest opinions if they knew they were going to be public. Oh, wait, those opinions were published all over the place by NASA itself.

Well, then, it must be because hiding the discussions shows how open NASA is now, willing to listen to all points of view. No, that doesn't make any sense either.

OK, there is no good justification for NASA's decision to suddenly start withholding documents. But NASA knows what's best -- let's just trust NASA. Let's just trust NASA people like the Chief Engineer, uh, wait, I mean let's trust NASA people like the Chief of Safety, um, I mean, like former JSC safety team member Charlie Camarda, ok, hold on a second, I'll think of it.

Andy: Thank you, STS-121 Commander Steven Lindsey, for taking time out of your busy day to sit down with us.

Lindsey: Steve.

Andy: No, it's Andy.

Lindsey: No, it's Steve, not Steven.

Andy: And you can call me, Andy.

Steve: Uh, thanks, I guess.

Andy: As a regular reader of Andromeda blog, Steve, you know these are pull-no-punches interviews. We ask the questions no one dares to ask. So brace yourself.

Steve: What blog did you say?

Andy: Eileen Collins has been telling everyone who will listen that you will never be able to match her picture-perfect space station docking from STS-114.

Steve: Well, --

Andy: She says you're not pilot enough, not man enough, to even come close.

Steve: OK, that may be --

Andy: She says that you're being from California will likely hamper you, compared to a New Yorker.

Steve: I don't see how that --

Andy: So she suggested we ask you if you knew what "RCS" stands for, and if you could demonstrate the difference between "yaw" and "roll."

Steve: Obviously --

Andy: Oh -- and she said you have to answer without looking at your hand. She said you drew a little diagram with labels for "yaw," "pitch" and "roll."

Steve: Well, you can see there's nothing --

Andy: Let's move on. You have flown over fifty different types of aircraft. Why can't you settle on one?

Steve: I feel the experience --

Andy: If there were an emergency on the shuttle, say an uncontrolled firing of the RCS, what are the chances that, in your excitement, you'll think you're in a Cessna?

Steve: An uncontrolled firing --

Andy: Stephanie Wilson has told us the commander is really the most unimportant crew member, since all the flying can be done automatically. In fact, she said the only equipment you are bringing are several boxes of bon-bons which you will pop luxuriantly into your mouth while the rest of the crew performs EVAs.

Steve: That's just ridiculous. You have to understand --

Andy: Again, thank you Commander Lindsey, for talking to us, and mostly we appreciate your thoughtful responses to our searching inquiries.

Steve: You're an idiot.

Andy: Join us for the next informative installment, readers, when we ask Mission Specialist Mike Fossum whether, as a Vigil Member of Order of the Arrow, he was offended by the DaVinci Code.

President Bush today sharply condemned the New York Times' disclosure of his low approval ratings. "The disclosure of this information is disgraceful," he said.

The ABC/Washington Post poll, showing Bush still dragging along the bottom in approval polls, was not actually reported by the New York Times, but the President blasted them anyway. "For people to leak that information and for the New York Times to publish it does great harm to the United States of America," Bush said, jabbing his finger for emphasis. He said the disclosure of his low approval ratings "makes it harder to win this war on terror."

Vice President Cheney echoed the the President's comments. Referring to a USA Today poll showing the President at a dismal 37% approval, Cheney told a crowd of bloated Republican donors that the New York Times, which has not even mentioned the USA Today story, had acted as the "leader" of these other news organizations. He added, "What is doubly disturbing to me is that they have been rewarded for these damaging reports, as Americans buy more newspapers when they contain information beyond what the Government is saying. I think that is a disgrace."

White House Spokesman Tony Snow explained the larger implications. "We are very concerned about the reckless decisions being made by the American people, in answering these polling questions. The President and the Vice President have both announced that the government is acting correctly. Yet the American people, who were never appointed by anyone, just take it upon themselves to say otherwise. Well, they really need to think about what they say to pollsters, and how much they are helping terrorists when they give honest opinions."

NASA Administrator Mike Griffin admitted exclusively to Andromeda that special security measures will be taken to prevent football hooliganism breaking out during the launch of STS-121. These procedures became necessary after Mission Specialist Piers Sellers, a native of Sussex, England, lunged wildly at Mission Specialist Thomas Reiter, from Frankfurter/Main, Germany, during a press event Saturday. Sellers, who had been "preparing" for the England-Ecuador match all Saturday afternoon, began singing, "Ten German bombers flying through the air ...," despite having been told repeatedly not to mention the war.

Reiter responded by patiently explaining the German 2-0 victory over Sweden, illustrating some of the finer points by flinging chairs about. He then commented on England's 2-2 tie with Sweden and inquired whether all English men continued breast-feeding into adulthood, which led to Sellers leaping at Reiter, tripping over Mission Specialist Lisa Nowak's leg, but still swinging, he struck Reiter in the hip with his fist, and in the knee with his face. As blood gushed from his mouth, he sputtered something about Dunkirk, and passed out.

Griffin said the crew of STS-121 would be expanded, to permit a line of German police officers, backed by their British counterparts, to keep Reiter and Sellers apart during take-off. "Obviously, this will be difficult, since Sellers are sitting next to each other in the back row on launch," Griffin noted, "but something had to be done."

Andromeda is a brave blog, it is a courageous blog, it is not "risk-averse." To the contrary, Andromeda has large brass ones, the size of coconuts. Which brings us to the latest tedious complaint from a small whining subset of our dedicated and loyal fans: more people die from getting on the head with coconuts than with space shuttles. Or something like that.

To that, we have two responses. First, Andromeda can only do so much, and saving those who loiter endlessly 'neath the palms, heaving great sighs and reciting odes to nature, well, that we must leave to others. Second, Andromeda has never questioned the bravery of the NASA Administrators in approving this flight -- it has only suggested, in the politest way it knows, that their explanations of the risks are stupid, incredibly, astonishingly, breathtakingly, so.

Coconut Administrator: ... and so, I have made the command decision to order the country's top coconut researchers to go out and stand under the palm trees, as close as possible to the trunks.

Q: Administrator, you say there were two votes against -- who were they?

A: Umm, well, let's see, who were they, who were they, oh, yes, here it is. The Coconut Falling Expert and the Head Injury Specialist believed there were some sort of risks associated with our program. But they said they were all for it, if we would just go out and get some helmets first. But I made the command decision, to go ahead immediately.

Q: Are you confident then there is no risk to the Coconut Team due to proceeding without these, what did you call them, oh, "helmets"?

A: We do not believe we are risking crew. Keep in mind, we have a bare-headed rescue team standing by, just in case something completely unanticipated happens.

On the other hand, if NASA announces it is replacing the tiles with papier mache, and there is now a 99.9% chance of burn-up while moving to Pad 39-B on the Mobile Launcher Platform, but everyone in the vicinity is aware of the danger and has signed on, well, Andromeda will start mixing the flour and water.

Here at Andromeda, we understand risk. Why, just the other day, as we were putting on our flip-flops, we noticed the center toe masts had signs of wear. Naturally, we performed the required wind tunnel tests and reviewed data on the materials, as well as historical data showing failure frequency, severity and cause. Once that was all done, we were late for work, so we ran out the door. As we dashed across the street through heavy traffic, the completely unpredictable happened: the flip-flop broke and fell off! We turned around to get it, just as a fuel tanker was careening towards us and an unfortunately timed "Baby Carriage Parade" formed on the street corner. Hopefully, you are not like the police, going on and on, all about "who's to blame," blah, blah, blah, but you recognize the only important question is: Did we thoroughly study the risk? Yes, we did.

Similarly, the risk of foam liberation from the ice/frost ramps on the external tank has been thoroughly studied. Looking at 11 flights, Lockheed-Martin found a mere 12 foam losses believed to be due to delamination. NASA showed the "top ten" at the post-FRR press conference. The top ten ranged in mass from 0.022 pounds to 0.121 pounds. Happily, only one exceeded the "maximum expected debris limit" of 0.08 pounds. Hooray!

Now, there may be some silly people out there who ask, in their silly way, what "maximum expected debris limit" has to do with anything. Oh, you big sillies! It has nothing to do with anything. But talking about it shows only one instance in excess of it, so that's good. Of course, there's always the kooky, wild-eyed crazies, like the Marshall Space Flight Center Safety Engineering Review Panel, who insist on bringing "safety requirements" into this. Safety requirements? Who needs em? But just to humor those big dopes, what is the the safety requirement limit?

The safety requirement is believed to be more than an order of magnitude smaller than .08 lbm. (on the order of .004 lbm), but has not been fully defined and allocated down to the ET.

"On the order of 0.004 pounds"? Hmm, well, that would mean there have been a lot of foam loss events that exceed safety requirements, and it is certainly possible, then, in theory, that there could be such an event when Discovery is launched. But what type of loss event is reasonably possible?

MSFC Engineering has performed a similar assessment and has identified a potential loss of up to .2276 lbm (3 sigma) and more variability in the flight history data. MSFC Engineering has considered other tanks (not just SLWTs) in their analysis and has not concurred with the Lockheed Martin findings/approach.

You may ask, who should you believe? Lockheed-Martin who, as the manufacturer of the external tank, is completely unbiased and has studied only 11 tanks, or this "Marshall Space Flibberty Hoohaw" and their nonsensical 'three sigma' babble?

Well, if that is what you ask, then you just have not been following along. The only question is, did you study it, and did you discuss it? The only two questions.

You, the loyal and dedicated readers of Andromeda, already knew that NASA was jes' joshin' about the "Launch on Need" (LON) rescue mission by Atlantis (as STS-300) in the event Discovery (STS-121) is unable to return due to damage to its tiles from a foam hit. You knew that it was a mythical option since Tuesday. Now, Florida Today has teased an explicit admission out of NASA:

NASA could not fix a serious foam-shedding problem in time to launch a rescue mission if Discovery suffers severe damage during its July 1 launch, the agency's top safety officer said Wednesday.

But wait, then, why did Safety Office Bryan O'Connor and NASA Chief Engineer Christopher Scolese, who voted "NO GO," decide not to "lie in a flame trench" over this?

"Given the fact that we do have many options available to us to protect the crew and the orbiter, the (engineering) community is not against the decision to fly," Scolese said.

But what are the "many options"?

Discovery's astronauts could try to make repairs or stay on the station until a rescue mission could be launched.

Well, even Administrator Griffin called those repair capabilities rudimentary (pdf, page 36), and you just said the rescue mission could not be launched in time! And Contingency Shuttle Crew Support (CSCS) was the reason Scolese hand wrote (pdf, page 8) for not appealing the launch decision. Has everyone lost the capacity for logical thinking?

O'Connor said a decision to put another shuttle and another crew at risk would be a tough call.

"At the very least, there would be a big discussion about whether we are ready to go do that," he said. "But we would have people we would need to bring back. So I'm sure that would color our discussion as well."

A "tough call"? Let's just follow this line of thinking through. Nine people packed in the ISS based upon the third unanticipated serious foam strike in the last three missions. Previously, slow, methodical repairs resulted in failures. Previously, thorough testing still did not prevent the very failures they were testing for. And now, rushed repairs, with no testing, will send at least two more crew members up?

Possible NASA Press Conference, Late July 2006.

Q: Mr. Griffin, Mr. Griffin!

A: Yes, you.

Q: Look, we all knew you were just kidding when you talked about "mitigation" of crew risk through tile repairs, and we had a good laugh when you talked about "launch on need" following yet another unanticipated foam strike. And I know I personally high-fived you for not mentioning the abort risks when you talked about ascent risk. But -- and I know this makes us look pretty stupid -- we actually believed you when you talked about CSCS. So my question is this. Are we stupid or what?

A: I wouldn't say that. I mean, who could have anticipated that doubling --

Q: Tripling --

Q: No, quadrupling --

A: OK, fine, whatever it is mathematically to go from a space station crew of two to a crew of 9 --

Q: That's 4-and-a-half times --

A: Thank you, but my point is, how would anyone know the increase in crew size would place any burden or stress on the station?

Q: Well, you know how long it took to fix the Elektron oxygen generator just last month.

A: So? That just means it's fixed, doesn't it? How could we possibly have known a month-old fix might fail again?

Q: But it failed before in 2004, for example, and in 2005 and was fixed, but still failed again last month. And the Vozdukh carbon dioxide scrubbers -- they just failed last year.

A: But you see --

Q: Didn't the Vozdukh also fail in 2002?

A: So why would we think --

Q: And in 2000?

A: But we knew the CDRAs in the American part --

Q: The system that failed in July 2002, September 2002, were out at least twice in November 2002?

A: Yes, that system --

Q: And again in 2003 and 2005?

A: Yes, yes, but why would anyone think it might possibly fail again? And anyway, the shuttle has carbon dioxide removal capability, and there's no reason to think that could ever fail.

Q: So the "Contingency Shuttle Crew Support" plan was to hope nothing went wrong for life support for 82 days, and to get two Soyuzes up and back before the air ran out?

A: Actually, CSCS was always tied to LON. We didn't really analyze what would happen if we couldn't find a solution to whatever went wrong with the first shuttle, test it, and retrofit, before air ran out at the station.

Q: Why aren't they using the new oxygen generation system they took up with them?

A: Oh, they will, they will, once it's installed.

Q: And how long will that take?

A: Oh, let's see, what time is it right now? Well, then it would be in a few months.

Q: With one Soyuz at the station, then, you just needed two more to get everybody down?

A: Exactly, exactly! They have an excellent record, 10 successful launches in 2003, 9 in 2004, and 11 in 2005. If the crew could just survive 60 to 80 days, we should be able to get them all back.

Q: Assuming nothing went wrong on the station?

A: That's right.

Q: But things did go wrong on the station, just as they have before.

A: (Puts on ruby slippers, clicks heels together) No crew risk, no crew risk!

Let's review. Columbia burned up on re-entry due to an unanticipated foam strike. That was February 1, 2003. NASA grounds the shuttle, and works on the foam problem for over two years, tells everyone it's solved, and launches Discovery on July 26, 2005. A pound of foam tears off strikes the TPS (thermal protection system) and shuttles are grounded again.

On July 1, 2006, they say they'll be ready to fly again. On Saturday, it was just the insignificant safety and engineering departments that opposed flight. Now, we learn that, although JSC, KSC, and MSFC all signed on the dotted line, Marshall Space Flight Center had some dissent within its ranks. Luckily, it was only the Safety Engineering Review Panel. And oh yeah, the Propulsion Systems Engineering and Integration teams (combined) from Johnson Space Center, Kennedy Space Center and Marshall Space Flight Center.

On March 1, 2006, loud noises were heard on the barge shipping the tank, but no cause was ever found. On March 3, a technician working on Discovery's thermal tiles smashed a heat lamp, spraying glass shards all around. While cleaning that up, technicians crashed into Discovery's robot arm. NASA took a safety time out. But dinged the external tank a few days later anyway, knocking off foam.

If that wasn't enough, the crew patch is a thinly disguised anarchy symbol.

As usual, the science-hungry blogging community has turned as one to Andromeda for a clear, concise explanation of NASA's "risk matrix" and the decision to fly STS-121. Well, if there's one thing we at Andromeda cannot stand, it's clamoring -- ceaseless, pitiful clamoring for our wisdom. If there's two things we can't stand, they're clamoring, and people who say "literally" when they mean "figuratively." And if there's three things we can't stand, they're clamoring, the "literally" thing, and genocide. And people who talk loud on their cell phones.

Flight Readiness Review, under the "new" new NASA, begins by gathering the entire team together and asking each to fill out a form, saying "GO" or "NO GO." Now, by defining the "team" broadly, NASA can create the impression that a "GO" decision is widely supported, because there were only two "NO GO" votes out of several dozen votes cast. Now, your carping critics like to say that this could be misleading, giving the impression of consensus if, for example, the laptop wrangler, the "Fuzzy Dice" tiger team, and the NASA Lunch Lady, okay flight, while the "Make Sure Nothing Explodes" team expresses reservations. Be that as it may, it is important that the two "NO" votes here were from teams in charge of relatively unimportant systems: the safety chief and NASA's chief engineer. Those were the only two votes against!

Bryan O'Connor, wearing the highly inflated title of "Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance," and Chris Scolese, who goes around calling himself, "NASA's Chief Engineer," rated the risk posed by the current configuration of the ice frost ramp as a "PROBABLE/CATASTROPHIC" threat. Yes, those words sound scary, but remember, you don't have to fly in the thing.

Now, look at the chart provided by this web site. It shows how easily the words "probable" and "catastrophic" can be misunderstood. "Probable" simply means "expected in the life of the program." Well, foam loss around the ice ramp has already happened a few times, so you gotta START at "probable" on this crazy matrix. And then the word "catastrophic" also has a kooky definition: "Hazard could result in a mishap causing fatal injury to personnel and/or loss of one or more major elements of the flight vehicle or ground facility." That's COULD result in a mishap. And the loss of just ONE major element of the flight vehicle OR the ground facility triggers this confusing little word. So, if you translate these words into layman's language, "probable catastrophic" just means "something bad might happen." And keep in mind, only two members of the Flight Readiness Review said that!

The important thing to remember is NASA's lost only two vehicles in over 100 flights. To put that in real terms, imagine you drive to work 250 times a year. Would you have any reluctance at all about getting into your car each morning if you knew it was only going to blow up killing everyone inside once every fifty or sixty drives? Of course not. Well, what if you were only going to drive that car 16 more times? And what if you planned to fix the problem before you've driven it even three or four more times? Obviously, that lowers the odds considerably, any statistician will tell you that.

As Wayne Hale explained (pdf), the important thing is not whether it was a good decision, or whether wise counsel was actually followed, but whether lots and lots of people got to ask questions:

"We had everyone engaged. It was a huge room full of people. I think that room holds about 250 people. It was full. There was overflow rooms provided, and I think we answered questions from all comers.

NASA Administrator Mike Griffin said the same thing at that press conference:

The discussion that you heard earlier about that since the day I walked into this position, I have said that we need to regain a culture of openness and a culture of willingness to engage in technical discussion on the merits without it having an adversarial component to it. We did that. If there was anybody in that room who didn't get to have their say, you are going to have to search them out because it was a great two days.

Everyone talked, and since others were nearby it's reasonable to assume everyone was listened to.

But the question the blogging community keeps pestering us about, strangely, is not, "Was it a good discussion?" but "Is there crew risk?" Mike Griffin answered that question categorically, "No, there is only programmatic risk." But can the crew be killed by programmatic risk? Absolutely not! Not anymore. With the new new NASA.

To begin with, the foam projectile problem is not an ascent risk. That foam may blow huge holes in the shuttle thermal protection system, but come on, this is a freaking huge rocket and ascent is not the problem.

So what if the TPS is shot to hell on ascent and the shuttle has no chance of re-entry? (a) the crew has practiced tile repair techniques; (2) there is a rescue option in the "Launch On Need" shuttle; and (3) the crew can hold out in the International Space Station for quite a while.

But wait, you say, Griffin himself later in the same press conference described those repair capabilities as "rudimentary," saying merely that "we are beginning to converge on some rudimentary repair methods that may be useful." Well, it's true the repair option isn't really much of an option at all. But luckily, there's old reliable "Launch on Need":

"OK, Atlantis, it looks like we're gonna have to use you as launch on need."
"Huh. Why is that?"
"Well, Discovery's TPS literally got shredded on ascent."
"Huh. Didn't you say that wouldn't happen?"
"Yep, but it did anyway, how about that?"
"Well, why won't that happen to us?"
"Our analysis shows it won't happen. Only the chief engineer and the safety dude disagree. Everyone else is on board. Literally."

So with no real repair capability, and the LON an equally mythical option, there's still the option of holing up in the ISS. In other words, the principal strategy for the next mission is to cross our fingers. (It worked for the ECO sensor problem on the last flight.)

10. Because he was right about the internet, right about global warming, right about the war, and right about Howard Dean and ... well, he was right about the internet, global warming, and the war.

9. The last time he ran for President, the campaign paid for a spiffy new cart for rolling his luggage through airports, but it's getting pretty worn and he could use a new one.

8. After all these bitter, divisive years of war, staggering budget deficits, obscene tax cuts for the rich, and the cynical exploitation of issues such as gay marriage and flag-burning, the country needs a President who will only talk about issues no one cares about, like global warming.

7. If he becomes President, he'll get access to all those NSA records and he can finally find out what Tipper was saying that time she was talking to her friend on the phone and kept looking at him and laughing. She said it wasn't about his beard, but the next time he saw her friend the first thing she said was, "Oh, Al, I love your beard!" Yeah, right, that's what you say to my face.

6. If Bush could use the Homeland Security alert system to get himself re-elected, then surely Gore, as President, can use it to clear the streets when he orders pizza.

5. By flipping the "reverse" switch on the NSA spying system, he can force the entire country to hear his global warming lecture every time they pick up the phone.

4. Once he announces the U.S. will again be a cooperative member of the world community, he'll be able to travel abroad without the Canadian flag sticker on his backpack.

3. After following his advice to invest in the heretofore little-known company, Amalgamated Daffodil Abatement, all his friends will make Cheney-sized killings in the market when he announces his plan to require all cars to run on happiness and sunshine, with daffodils as exhaust.

2. The election of Al Gore to the Presidency will finally force The Daily Howler to stop picking on poor Frank Rich, whose only crime is columnizing the best way a millionaire scribe can, with his limited finances. And limited intellectual resources. And limited researching skills. And limited editorial judgment.

1. Al Gore should run for President because this time he won't have to waste all that time talking to the "people," as he's heard the Supreme Court just loves drowning polar bear cartoons.

Andy: Is it hot in here, or is it just me?

Global Warming: I think it's just your imagination.

Andy: OK, first hard-hitting question. Why didn't the "new Al Gore" campaign in 2000?

Global Warming: I don't know what you're talking about.

Andy: Are you saying you feel Al Gore hasn't changed, only the media "narrative" has changed?

Global Warming: Um, no. I don't believe in Al Gore. I realize that many "Gorologists" claim he exists, but call me a skeptic.

Andy: You did finger-quotes for "Gorologists," but not for "skeptics," even though you said that's what we should call you. Are you using finger quotes "correctly"?

Global Warming: Look we have some serious issues to talk about here. This is a planetary emergency, don't you care about that?

Andy: Yeah, yeah, yeah, it's always catastrophe this, and emergency that with you guys, so I gotta stop driving my S.U.V. on my pony on my boat. I think if it really was an emergency, President Bush would be on vacation right now, and if it really was a catastrophe, somebody would be receiving a Medal of Freedom, and since neither of those is happening, isn't it true you're just blowing a lot of hot air?

Global Warming: Is that supposed to be some kind of joke?

Andy: Global Warming a joke? You admit it!

Global Warming: No, I don't admit it. The end of civilisation, a joke? I don't think so.

Andy: And then something about Los Angeles.

Global Warming: What?

Andy: After you say "the end of civilization," you say "like Los Angeles" or something like that.

Global Warming: Can't we get back to the subject at hand? Greenhouse gases are increasing, the annual average temperature of the atmosphere near the surface of the Earth is skyrocketing, it may already be too late!

Andy: Yes, you're right, back to the subject at hand. Watching "An Inconvenient Truth," I was deeply moved by something, something I suspect a lot of people noticed: Al Gore's bald spot seems to have disappeared.

Global Warming: What?

Andy: Yeah, I know. How could that happen? Is it like the hole in the ozone?

Global Warming: You're an idiot. Your planet deserves to die.

Andy: Well, thank you for sitting down to talk with us, Global Warming. Everyone, be sure and pick up Global Warming's new book, "Does Al Gore Really Exist, or Was He Just a Weather Balloon?"